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There seems to be a wide agreement in Portuguese society that the legal 
system is one of the main structural problems and one reason for the anemic  
economic growth experienced in recent years. The objective of 
this paper is twofold. First, it offers a view on the state of the Portuguese judicial 
system over the past two decades and contributes with a perspective on the reasons 
Portuguese justice can be perceived as a roadblock on economic development. 
Second, it goes further and tries to explore potential answers by constructing an 
econometric model that o e ts judge’s p odu ti it  ith its pote tial  
determinants. Furthermore, this econometric model also deals with endogeneity 
issues not dealt with in similar studies. 
JEL Codes: K40, P37  









1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 4 
2. Sketch and evolution of the Portuguese judicial system ............................................ 7 
2.1. The Portuguese Judicial system .......................................................................... 7 
2.2. Evolution of the Portuguese judicial system ....................................................... 9 
3. The Portuguese Judicial System for 1993 to 2911: Key indicators ............................ 13 
4. Panel estimation .....................................................................................................  24 
4.1 The Data ............................................................................................................ 25 
4.2 OLS model ......................................................................................................... 26 
4.1.1 OLS Results ................................................................................................. 29 
4.2 Two-way Fixed effect model .............................................................................. 29 
4.2.2 Two-way FE Results .................................................................................... 31 
5. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 33 
References .................................................................................................................. 35 
Appendix I ................................................................................................................... 37 
Appendix II .................................................................................................................. 41 
 
 




Portugal is seen as having a legal system below European standards (Tavares 
(2004)). It would take more than two years of court work to deal with the amount of 
work unfinished in past years, and this is due to a deficit in the ability to supply an 
amount of justice enough to meet the demand (that is, the number of filed files have 
almost always surpassed the number of finished files). 
Figure 1: Portuguese judicial system 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
The negative impact of the number of pending files in judicial courts can be very 
troublesome. For instance, in Portuguese courts, it takes almost two times as many 
days to collect a check returned for nonpayment than the average court in Djankov et 
al. (2003) study (441 against 234 days). Moreover, there is a wide agreement in 
Portuguese society that the legal system is one of the main structural problems and 
one likely reason for the anemic potential economic growth. Justice is perceived by 
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the judicial system define it has been a huge hurdle for business activities (Fundação 
Francisco Manuel dos Santos (2013))
2
. 
A proper working judicial system can be of the highest degree of significance to 
a  e o o ’s pe fo a e. Fi st, o l  a sou d judi ial s ste  a  ensure the 
enforcement of property rights, and this fact has enormous consequences on the 
investment decisions both domestic and international. Second, not only investment is 
affected, every exchange of goods and services relies on an environment where 
contracts are properly protected by law. If the judicial system is an obstacle to the free 
exchange between economic agents, it is imposing an unnecessary friction to the 
economy.  
Already Adam Smith recognized the link between justice and economic growth: 
Little else is e uisite to a  a state to the highest deg ee of opule e […], ut 
pea e, eas  ta es, a d a tole a le ad i ist atio  of justi e…  (Smith (1755)). Recent 
works have also established a connection between the legal system and economic 
development (see Glaeser et al (2004)). Moreover, Tavares (2004) finds evidence 
supporting the need to reform the Portuguese legal system in order to create growth 
stimulus.  
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it offers a view on the state of the 
Portuguese judicial system over the past 20 years and documents the reasons 
Portuguese justice can be perceived as a roadblock on economic development. 
Second, it goes further and tries to explore potential answers by constructing an 
                                                        
2
 Even though, a recent survey by Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos shows an interesting fact: 
businessmen who deal, on a daily basis, with the judicial system do not perceive it as been too slow. 
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econometric model that connects judge’s productivity with its potential determinants. 
The innovative feature is the use of a richer and flexible database and the ability to 
tackle endogeneity issues not dealt with in previous papers. 
The link between judicial productivity and the workload faced by courts is not a 
novel insight. Works such as Dimitrova-Grajzl et al (2012) offer evidence supporting 
this view. Their main findings are a statistically significant impact of courts caseload on 
productivity, while the number of judges in each court is not significant for an increase 
in productivity. There is also evidence for Portugal - Martins (2010) -  of a causal effect 
of the caseload on productivity in Portuguese first instance courts. 
This work is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 I give a brief recap about the 
structure of the Portuguese judicial system and a short chronological journey through 
it. Chapter 3 presents some facts and tries to explain the behavior of the Portuguese 
Judicial system. This work puts forward the conclusion that the Portuguese judicial 
system has, in fact, several problems, and the main difficulty is the demand for 
executive litigation not matched by enough productivity. Moreover, the solutions put 
forward were not, by all means, sufficient. To further understand productivity in the 
Portuguese Judicial system, section 3 presents a model for judge’s Productivity with 
three key ingredients: average caseload per judge, number of judges and the average 
number of judicial workers per judge. I conclude by showing that the amount of 
o kload positi el  i pa ts o  judge’s p odu ti it . I  o t ast, the appointment of 
judges has a negative causal effect on judicial productivity. 
 




2. Sketch and evolution of the Portuguese judicial system 
This chapter introduces the structure of the Portuguese judicial system and makes a 
brief recap of the main reforms in recent decades. Section 2.1 gives a brief summary 
about the way Portuguese judicial courts are structured and was partially based on the 
work by Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos – Justiça Económica em Portugal, 
Volume I. Section 2.2 presents a brief journey through the main judicial reforms 
implemented in the last three decades. This last section was partly based on Sousa 
Santos (2006). 
2.1. The Portuguese Judicial system 
The Portuguese legal system comprises different types of courts. This work will deal 
with a specific type of court – the judicial courts. Judicial courts are ruled by different 
types of jurisdiction (competência): i) territory, ii) substance (matéria), iii) hierarchy, 
and iv) value of the claim (valor da causa). 
i) The Portuguese judicial territory is divided into judicial districts. There are 
four judicial districts: Lisboa, Porto, Coimbra, and Évora. Each judicial 
district is divided into judicial circles. Finally, each judicial circle is divided 
into comarcas. 
ii) Regarding hierarchy, judicial courts have a vertical hierarchy: First instance 
judicial courts, second instance judicial courts, and the supreme court of 
justice. The first instance courts deal with, fundamentally, the newly 
entered cases. First instance courts are the majority of courts in the judicial 
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system and deal with the most part of filed litigations. The second instance 
courts are generally appeal courts. The supreme court of justice is the 
highest court of the hierarchy and deals with litigation that has been dealt 
by a first instance court and a second instance court. The supreme court 
rules over the entire territory while the second instance courts, which are 
distributed by each judicial district, have jurisdiction over a specific area. 
iii) Substance (matéria). Judicial courts can be divided by its substance into 
three types of courts. Generic substance courts, specific substance courts, 
and specialized substance courts. Generic substance courts are assigned 
with the responsibility to settle all kinds of dispute, dealing with all disputes 
not dealt by the remaining two types of courts. Each Comarca usually has a 
Tribunal de comarca and they are, as a rule, generic substance courts. 
However, Tribunais de Comarca can be decomposed into generic substance 
courts and specific substance courts, they can be Juízos cíveis and Juízos 
criminais, varas cíveis, varas criminais, juízos de pequena instância cível, 
juízos de pequena instância criminal, or juízos de execução. Specific 
substance courts deal with certain types of litigation defined by law. 
Tribunais de comarca and specific substance courts usually have jurisdiction 
over the comarca they are located. Lastly, specialized substance courts are 
assigned exclusive jurisdiction to resolve certain types of disputes according 
to their subject in one or more jurisdictions. Specializes substance courts 
can have jurisdiction over one or more comarcas. Especialized substance 
courts can be divided in Instrução criminal, Family, Menores, Labor courts, 
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Comerce, Intelectual property, sea, execução de penas, civel, criminal and 
concorrência, supervisão e regulação courts. As a general rule, litigations 
should e esol ed i  the ou t hi h has ju isdi tio  i  the domicílio do 
demandado .  
iv) Value of the claim (valor da causa). First instance courts can also be divided 
according to the value of the claim. Varas cíveis have jurisdiction on 
lawsuits were the value of the claim is higher than lawsuits judge by second 
instance courts. Juízos de pequena instância deal with processos 
sumaríssimos. Juízos cíveis judge lawsuits not dealt by Varas cíveis or Juízos 
de pequena instância.  
The two most representative types of espécies processuais (i.e. the purpose of the 
lawsuit) are declarative actions (i.e. actions in which a court judges the existence of 
certain rights were lenders do not have a document that proves his rights) and 
executive actions (i.e. a court judges an action in which a right has been recognized by 
a different court or the litigant has a document proving his claim).  
 
2.2. Evolution of the Portuguese judicial system 
Portugal, as a democratic country, has witnessed more than 35 years of laws trying to 
reform the judicial system. Back in 1978 the excessive number of courts, or the lack of 
demand in some courts, was already documented (decreto lei nº 269/78), however, in 
spite of that, more courts where created. The year 1988 also witnessed the need to 
reform the geographic distribution of courts and to raise expenditure in physical 
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capital (IT equipment and buildings) (Decreto-lei nº 214/88). The same law saw the 
ending of Julgados de Paz. The novel idea was the introduction of Tribunais de Círculo 
(to deal with higher amount litigations and more serious crimes) which was seen as a 
path breaking reform in the judicial system and a way to solve some of the problems 
faced by judicial courts. The increase in the number of courts followed in 1988 
(Decreto-lei nº 214/88, 17 june).  The same Decreto-Lei also introduced another 
innovation: specialized courts, as a way to improve the efficiency of the judicial 
system. Courts such as Varas cíveis and juízos criminais in Porto and Lisboa, or 
Tribunais do  Trabalho and Tribunais de pequenas causas were created at that time.  
In 1993 a new type of parajudicial instrument is created, called injunction, an attempt 
to lift the burden of pending files and to soften the demand for justice. However, this 
type of procedure – to deal with low pecuniary value execution files – was far from 
successful as Decreto-Lei nº 269/98 states. Only after some improvements – in 1998 – 
the Injunction procedure made an impact. The creation of new courts and the demand 
asymmetry between courts, where addressed in Decreto-lei nº 222/94 and decreto-lei 
nº 152/95 by updating, once more, the number of judges.  
1996 saw the end of Tribunal de círculo and that reform was even described as a 
experiência maléfica . The i ease i  the u e  of ou ts a d judges follo ed i  
1996 (Decreto-lei nº 173/96) and 1998 (Decreto-lei nº 119/98, 24 de abril). Law nº 3/99 
introduced the assessor role as a way to help judges with their work, carrying simpler 
tasks and lifting the burden from judges. A further specialization of courts was defined 
as a way to increase courts’ efficiency and effectiveness. Decreto-lei nº 178/2000 still 
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identified problems faced in previous years: insufficient number of judges, and 
assessores. So, an appointment of new judges was made and more assessores where 
hired. 
Decreto-lei nº 148/2004 tried to solve the problem of execution files by creating Juízos 
de Execução. In this way, there was a migration of pending files from Juízos and Varas 
to Juízos de execução, a specialized type of court to handle execution files. In 
perspective, Juízos de Execução as see  as a disaste . “ousa “a tos  
Moreover, the large boost in demand, in the last decade, was tackled by creating new 
solutions and instruments to deal with the problem of overburdened courts. Registo 
civil began to deal with mutual consent divorces, Solicitadores de execução started 
handling some of the work (execution files related) previously executed by judges. In 
criminal justice, low-amount bounced checks and the consumption of some type of 
drugs stopped being criminalized. Moreover, in order to decrease the number of 
pending files and the number of filed files, the state gave up some fines related to 
litigation that where pending in courts and introduced other innovations like 
converted transgressões into contra-ordenações (1995). It also tried to do a reform on 
processo civil with the intent of simplifying some procedures.      
The last 35 years saw a myriad of reforms of the judicial system, however the end 
result is doubtful. Reforms that altered the geographic division of courts were not 
based on clear measures and empirical studies (Sousa Santos, 2006). The only large 
reform made to alter the judicial geography failed – the Tribunais de Círculo reform. A 
lot has been made to deal with the ever ending increase in demand: increase in courts, 
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creation of several specialized courts, hiring of judges and assessores, increase in IT 
and other physical capital, and many other measures, such as the conversion of 
transgressões into contra-ordenações. However, some of those measures did not seem 
to have worked properly. The introduction of Injunções has taken 5 years and some 
improvements in order to be fully accepted, Juízos de Execução have been largely 
criticized, and some of the remaining solutions described above seem to have lacked 
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3. The Portuguese Judicial System for 1993 to 2911: Key 
indicators 
 
Chapter 1 showed a broad picture on the state of the Portuguese judicial 
system. The goal of this section is to introduce some key indicators that are used to 
gather a number of stylized facts about the Portuguese judicial system in the period 
from 1993 to 2012. In doing so, it also tries to unveil some co-movements between 
important variables.  
This section is structured as follows: First, it motivates the problem by using a couple 
of indicators that allow us to get a better grasp of the difficulties that Portuguese 
judicial courts have been facing over the last 19 years. Second, having spotted the 
main problem, it tries to further study those difficulties by introducing a measure of 
productivity and demand. Both first and second steps are going to look into the 
Portuguese judicial system using different perspectives: by area of litigation, types of 
courts, and economic areas. Finally, the third part of this section is going to look at 
some correlations between variables important to our work. 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, the Portuguese Judicial system obeys a certain 
hierarchy: it can be divided into first instance courts, second instance courts and the 
Supreme Court. First instance courts account for 96.2% of total filed files in the period 
from 1993 to 2012. Having the largest share of filed lawsuits, it is not surprising that 
first instance courts have the majority of pending files in Portuguese courts. The 
interesting fact is the path of pending files in each court. The number of pending files 
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in second instance courts and in the Supreme Court has been declining over the years, 
however in first instance courts the number of pending files has been steadily growing, 
with only a small decrease from 2005 to 2008. (Appendix I, Figures 1, 2 and 3) 
The number of pending files gives us a first glance on the state of justice, however it 
would be more informative to consider, also, the ability of a court to finish its pending 
and filed files over a given year. For that reason, below we assemble a first indicator 
that will help us understand the state of the Portuguese Judicial system. 





number of terminated files  
Backlog Clear Rate ,
number of filed files  + number of pending files
 set of courts, 1993,..., 2011        (3.1)
i t
i t






Figure 1: Backlog Clear rate by type of judicial court 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
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The Backlog Clear rate gives us a measure of the ability of a given court to terminate all 
its caseload over a given year. Figure 1 delivers the same message as given above: 
second instance courts and the Supreme Court have raised their ability to produce 
justice relative to their caseload, whereas first instance courts have worsened their 
capability to produce justice relative to their caseload.  
Given all of the above, if we want to understand the difficulties faced by Portuguese 
courts to produce justice, we must look more closely into first instance courts.  
First instance courts deal with a broad array of filed files. Those files can be divided 
into five areas of litigation: cível, penal, tutelar, tutelar penal, and laboral files.3  
 
Figure 2: Number of filed files by area of litigation 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
 
                                                        
3
 These five areas of litigation for Portuguese judicial courts can have the following translation: Civil, 
criminal, family, criminal family, and labor, respectively. 
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Figure 2 gives us the number of files filed in first instance courts from 1993 to 2011. It 
is clear that the number of cível files entered in courts has been rising in absolute 
terms as well as in relative terms. Particularly, in 2011, the number of cível files was 
the vast majority of files entered in courts, they account for 76.5% of all filed files.  
Figure 3: Backlog Clear rate by Area of litigation 
   
 Source: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
 
As shown in Figure 3, from all five areas of litigation represented in first instance 
courts, the Backlog Clear rate on cível files is the only one that has been declining 
steadily over the years. That fact, and the weight of cível files on the total number of 
filed files, has pulled the total Backlog Clear rate into a declining trend.  
Cível files can also be divided into different types of files. Namely, executive 
proceedings (acções executivas), economic files, declarative proceedings (acções 
declarativas) and other files.  
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Figure 3: Filed by type of Civel files 
  
Source: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
Note, in Figure 3, the large increase, over the years, in the number of execution files 
filed in first instance courts. In 1993 execution files accounted for 39.5% of all files 
entered in first instance courts, and by the year 2011 59.7% of all the filed files were 
execution files. 
Figure 4: Backlog Clear rate by type of Civel file 
  
Source: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 




Figure 4 shows that execution files are the only type of cível file with a declining 
Backlog Clear rate. 
This last couple on graphs give us important insight: the reason the Backlog Clear rate 
on cível files has been steadily declining is twofold: i) the Backlog Clear rate on 
execution files has been declining, in fact this is the only type of cível file that has a 
clear declining trend; ii) the large – relative and absolute – weight of execution files on 
cível files. This allows us to conclude that the main reason the judicial system is facing 
difficulties can be assigned to execution files filed in first instance courts.  
Also, notice also the behavior of economic files. In 1993 they had a Backlog Clear rate 
close to zero and in 2011 they are the type of cível file with the higher Backlog Clear 
rate.  
 
Although Portugal is a small country, distinct geographical areas can be found. 
Particularly, economic development is not homogeneous throughout the country. 
Therefore, we have divided Portugal into three different areas regarding their 
economic development. To do so we used the number of companies in each concelho 
as a proxy for economic development. The overall Backlog Clear rate on first instance 
courts has been declining over the three types of regions considered (Appendix I, 
Figure 4), Does that behavior extends to all type of courts considered in our analysis? 
The overall picture is that there is a marked difference between courts regarding their 
ability to produce justice relative to their workload. Since year 2000 Tribunal de 
Comarca’s edia  Backlog Clear rate has been declining. However, for instance, 
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Tribunais do Comércio and Varas Mistas have been increasing their median Backlog 
Clear rate. Note that the introduction of Juízos de Execução implied a change of trend 
in the median of the Backlog Clear rate for Juízos Cíveis and Varas Cíveis. (Figure 5, 
appendix I) The median Backlog Clear rate for Juízos de execução has been trending up, 
but it had a very low starting point. The change in trend in Juízos Civeis and Varas cíveis 
when Juízos de Execução was created is not a coincidence. Juízos de execução were 
created precisely to deal with executive files, and that meant a migration of executive 
files from courts, such as Juízos cíveis and Varas cíveis, to Juízos de execução. The 
pertinent question is: Does that change made an impact? That is, are Juízos de 
Execução more productive handling execution files than Juízos Cíveis or Varas cíveis? 
At the moment we lack the necessary tools to provide an answer, but near the end of 
the Chapter we tackle this question.      
 
A Backlog Clear rate equal to one would indicate that a given court was able to 
finish all pending and entered files in a given year. This is perhaps a too demanding 
benchmark. A more realistic benchmark would be one file finished for each file 
entered. That would stop the number of pending files from growing year after year. So, 





number of terminated files
clearance rate ,        , 1993, , 2011      (3.2)
number of filed files
i set of courts t    
 
Looking at the average clearance rate for all courts and files, we find that the average 
clearance rate is slightly above one. However, the average hides large outliers. In fact if 
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instead we look at the median clearance rate, since the year 2000 the median 
clearance rate for all files and courts is below one (Table I and Figure 6, Appendix I). As 
we already spotted the root of the problem – execution files – let us see what 
information the clearance rate has to offer.  
 
Figure 5: Clearance by type of Civel file 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
 
As expected, the median clearance rate for execution files is particularly low. In fact, 
since 2000 the median clearance rate is below one and trending down (Figure 5). 
 
The clearance rate captures the ability of a court, in a given year, to fulfill the 
demand for justice. However, a court can increase its clearance ratio only because 
fewer files are filed in a given year, maybe due to economic conditions. It is also 
possible that this same court increased its clearance ratio owing to a productivity rise.  
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In the justice sector, the courts can be seen as production units which combine certain 
inputs, such as judges, clerks, or buildings, and whose main output can be measured 
by the number of resolved cases in a given year.  







   
   
           (3.3)
      
i t
i t i t i t
i t
i ti t i t
i t
number of terminated files
number of terminated files resources productivity
Clearancerate




Where resources is defined as4 
, , ,0.7*number of judges 0.1*total number of judicial servants             (3.4)i t i t i tresources  
 
The annual average productivity has been growing in line with the annual average 
demand. However, since 2001, the annual average demand has been above average 
productivity, which explains a declining clearance rate, if we consider the overall 
number of files in first instance courts (Figure 7, Appendix I). 
 
We have seen that execution files have the worst clearance rate and, at the 
same time, are the majority of files entered in courts. On the other hand, Tribunal de 
Comarca is the type of court most common in Portugal. Given that, over the last 21 
years the average clearance ratio has been most of the time below one (Table II, 
Appendix I), it makes sense to further analyze execution files in Tribunais de Comarca. 
                                                        
4
 The use of weights on the formula for resources was purely subjective. It is intended to give more 
weight to the contribution of judges to production and less weight to the contribution of judicial 
workers per judge. 
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The median clearance rate of execution files in Tribunais de Comarca has been lower 
than one in most years, however the median clearance rate is particularly low in 
Tribunais de Comarca courts in regions with many companies. 
 
Figure 6: Productivity and demand by economic region in T. Comarca 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
 
We find that the reason the median clearance rate is very low in courts belonging to 
regions with many companies is due to an increase in demand not closely followed by 
an increase in productivity. While to a lesser extent, the same has happened in less 
developed regions (Figure 6). 
 
Above we questioned whether it was worth to create Juízos de Execução to deal with 
executive files. Figure 7 can shed some light on this matter. When it comes to 
productivity on executive files, Varas cíveis and Juízos Cíveis have historically low 
values. The introduction of Juízos de Execução seemed to bring a productivity boost to 
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execution files however, it soon started to drastically lose their ability to deal with 
execution files and their productivity has been on a declining trend.  (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Productivity by Court 
    
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
 
Lastly, we report some findings on the correlation between productivity, the caseload 
and the number of judges. The correlation between productivity and demand, using all 
the courts in our sample, is strong – 0.58, and it increases to 0.83 if we only take into 
account Tribunais de Comarca. That behavior is graphically depicted in Figure 6. 










Source: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
 
There is also a strong correlation between the number of judges and productivity, and 
between demand and productivity in Tribunais de Comarca. Does that correlation 
results from a causality effect? We try to answer that and similar questions in the next 
Chapter. 
4. Panel estimation 
With the increasingly high demand faced by Portuguese judicial courts, it is of 
paramount importance to foster productivity of first instance courts. This chapter tries 
to model total productivity of courts based on a set of determinants, both internal and 
external to court activity.   
In this Chapter I describe the data used in the empirical analysis, present the 
models, discuss the choice of variables and comment on results. 
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4.1 The Data 
The panel I employ was built using annual data on first instance judicial courts 
covering a maximum time span from 1993 to 2011. The types of courts included in the 
sample are: Tribunal de Comarca, Juízo cível, Vara Cível, Vara mista, Tribunal do 
Trabalho, Tribunal do Comércio, and Juízo de execução. The panel includes variables 
internal to courts (such as the number of files, the number of judges or the number 
judicial workers) and variables external to courts (for instance, the number of 
companies or a purchasing power index). Appendix II Table VI presents the list of 
variables, the corresponding description and source. It is a rich panel data that enables 
us to follow, in a specific type of court, the number of lawsuits, by each type of lawsuit, 
in a given year.   
It is worth to comment on some particularities. First, the data on variables 
internal to courts are at the comarca level, whereas variables external to courts usually 
correspond, in the Portuguese geographic division, to concelhos. Therefore, we could 
be in presence of a potential mismatch between comarca and concelho. Most of the 
comarcas have a one-to-one match with concelho. A problem may arise when the 
same concelho is divided into different comarcas, and that same comarca might or 
might not cover different concelhos. Due to the lack of information at the freguesia 
level, I chose not to include information on those concelhos and link those same 
comarcas with the rest of the concelhos into which a comarca might be divided. 
Second, the purchasing power index series has some missing years. I have chosen to fill 
in missing values with averages computed using adjacent years. Third, in 1995 many 
transgressões lawsuits were converted into contra-ordenações (Sousa Santos (2006)), 
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which meant a drastic break in the database for some series. (see, for instance, Figure 
7, appendix I). Thus I chose not to use the years 1993 and 1994 in the regressions 
performed in this Chapter. Fourth, even though the panel data comprises the 
abovementioned courts, I have chosen to use only Tribunais de comarca in the 
regressions plus Varas cíveis and juízos cíveis in Porto and Lisboa. The reason is 
threefold. First, there is a lot of heterogeneity between courts, so the use of Tribunais 
de comarca only offers a set of more homogeneous courts. I also use Varas cíveis and 
Juízos cíveis in Porto and Lisboa because there are no Tribunais de Comarca in Porto 
and Lisboa and so varas cíveis and juízos cíveis stand for Tribunais de comarca as they 
deal with roughly the same type of lawsuits. Second, Tribunais de comarca are the 
most common type of courts in the Portuguese judicial system. Third, the Direcção-
Geral da Política de Justiça (DGPJ) does not offer data on the number of judicial 
workers for most of the remaining type of courts in our data set. 
 
4.2 OLS model 
In order to study the potential determinants of the judicial productivity, my 
baseline model is the following: 
2011
1 2 3 4 5
1995
_ _ _ (4.1)it it it it it i it
i
total prod total caseload Judges jw judge PPI year u     

      
 
Equation (4.1) regresses total productivity of first instance courts,             , 
on determinants internal to courts, a variable controlling for external factors,      , 
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and a vector of dummy variables for the years. We will first study judicial courts 
productivity using an OLS methodology. 
The dependent variable,             , was built as in equation (3.3).    
                  represents the average amount of court work per judge at a 
given court i at year t. It was constructed as follows, 
total number of filed files  + total number of pending files
_ ,     
resources







                                 (4.2)
  
It is plausible that a higher amount of pending and entered files puts pressure on 
judges and, thus, they work harder. This increase in productivity could happen, for 
e a ple, e ause of a  i pa t o  judge’s eputatio  o  a ee  i e ti es see, fo  
instance, Luskin & Luskin (1986)). It could also happen that a judge, working on a court 
with smaller caseload per judge, has no incentive to resolve more cases or else he 
could become useless to the court in the following years. On the other hand, the 
inverse could occur as well: There is such an amount unfinished files that overcrowd a 
certain court, leading to a congestion effect (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al (2012)).  There is 
also empirical evidence of the latter case (e.g. Murrell (2001)). Therefore, the sign of 
the coefficient is ambiguous. 
          corresponds to the total number of judicial judges in court i at year t. 
The effect on the average productivity per judge of an increase in the number of 
judges is also uncertain. On the one hand, the increase in the number of judges in a 
given court could have positive externalities on the remaining judges. One reason this 
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could happen stems from the dissemination of more efficient practices (Martins 
(2010)) or the share of expertise. On the other hand, an increase in the number of 
judges in a certain court could act as a production disincentive on other judges. We 
could think in the same manner as a decrease in caseload: more judges will lower each 
judge’s aseload a d de ease the incentives to work. We can find support for both 
hypotheses in the empirical literature. Martins (2010) finds evidence of a negative 
relationship between the number of judges and average judicial productivity for 
Portuguese courts, whereas Beenstock and Haitosvky (2004) fail to gather statistical 
proof of a causal effect of the number of judges on judicial output in Israeli courts. 
             stands for the average number of judicial workers per judge in 
each court i at a given year t. This coeffi ie t’s sig  is also a iguous. The atio ale is 
similar to the effect of the number of judges on average judicial productivity. Even 
though judges work almost as an independent unit inside each court, they need inputs 
to carry out their work. One of the inputs is the number of judicial workers in each 
court. We could expect that an increase in the number of judicial workers helps judges 
perform their work and, thus, raise productivity. On the other hand, an increase of 
judicial staffing could produce incentives to lower production on the remaining judicial 
workers. 
       is a vector containing dummy variables for each year from 1996 to 2011 
(the omitted year is 1995). In Chapter 3 I have argued that productivity in executive 
lawsuits did not follow demand as to prevent the enormous increase in the number of 
pending files. However, the productivity indicator used in Chapter 3 did not take into 
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account other variables that could potentially make an impact on productivity. These 
variables will allow studying the average productivity path throughout the years, 
ceteris paribus.  
       stands for the purchasing power index of the concelho where the court is 
located. This variable intends to o t ol fo  ou t’s e te al dete i a ts of 
productivity. The database contains other series that potentially could be useful 
control variables. The reason for using only the PPI has to do with the strong 
correlation between those variables, namely: number of companies in the concelho, 
population density and secondary school years (see Table V, appendix III).  
4.1.1 OLS Results 
Table I Appendix II presents the results for the OLS regression. Holding other 
variables fixed, the results suggest an increase in average judicial productivity 
following an increase in average caseload per judge. The same is true for the number 
of judicial workers per judge, whereas the number of judges does not seem to be 
relevant to explain judicial productivity (P-value higher than 10%). Regarding the year 
dummy variables, Table I implies that productivity has been lower in most years 
relative to 1995. Finally, ceteris paribus, the difference in judicial productivity in the 
more developed regions relative to the remaining ones does not seem to be 
statistically significant. 
4.2 Two-way Fixed effect model 
Endogeneity is a problem that arises frequently in econometric modeling and 
one of the hardest issues one has to tackle in regressions. Broadly speaking, 
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endogeneity occurs when one or more independent variables are correlated with the 
error term. The literature defines three large classes of endogeneity: i) Reverse 
causality ii) Unobserved heterogeneity iii) Measurement errors. In the following I will 
argue that modeling judicial productivity in Portuguese first instance courts is only 
affected by unobserved heterogeneity. I then offer a solution for dealing with this 
issue?.  
A judge’s p odu ti it  ight depe d o  the a ou t of work per judge, as 
discussed above. However, the inverse is also plausible, for example that a court with 
higher productivity leads to higher demand for its services. As it turns out, this source 
of endogeneity – reversed causality – is not present in our judicial system because a 
2006 law states that lawsuits must be filled in a court based on the o plai i g pa t ’s 
concelho of residence. Another source of reversed causality presented by the empirical 
literature (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al (2012)) is the effect of judicial productivity on the 
appointment of judges. Intuitively, a decrease in productivity leads to an increase in 
the caseload per judge and, consequently, a need to appoint extra judges in the court 
that experiences lower average productivity. In the case of reverse causality between 
the appoi t e t of e  judges a d judge’s p odu ti it , e al ead  o t ol fo  the 
effect of a change in the caseload on the number of judges.  A common econometric 
solution to endogeneity problems is the use of instrumental variables (IV). 
Instrumental variables have to be chosen as to be highly correlated with the 
(potentially) endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term. Even though, 
in theory, this is a valid solution to endogeneity problems, in practice IV may produce 
deceptive results if uncorrelation with the error term (that is not possible to test) does 
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not hold. A third source of endogeneity is the impact of unobserved variables on one 
or more independent variables included in our model.  This unobserved omitted 
variables are often court-specific and do not change over time, such as reputation or 
criminal activity in the area where the court is located. It’s plausi le that this t pe of 
endogeneity occurs (e.g. higher business activity could lead to higher demand for a 
specific court). This last source of endogeneity is easier to tackle and it is not 
dependent on a subjective selection of instrumental variables. We are going to do a 
robustness check by using a set of IV to account for the second case of endogeneity 
referred above.  
We use a two-way fixed effects model (with cluster robust SE) as follows, 
1 2 3 4_ _ _            (4.3)it i t it it it it ittotal prod total caseload Judges jw judges PPI u           
 
   represents courts characteristics that are time invariant and    is a vector of year 
dummies similar to the OLS case.  
4.2.2 Two-way FE Results 
 Results for the two-way FE model are presented in Table II, in appendix II. There 
are important discrepancies between results in the OLS regression and the two-way FE 
model. The first thing to note is the change in sign for the coefficient of both judges 
and judicial workers per judge. Second, judicial staff per judge is no longer statistically 
significant and, on the other hand, judges became an important determinant of judge’s 
average productivity. Our model shows that an increase in the number of judges or in 
the u e  of judi ial staffi g pe  judge ould lead to a de ease i  a e age judge’s 
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productivity, ceteris paribus. This result is in line with the findings of Martins (2010) for 
the Portuguese case. Caseload keeps having a positive casual effect on judicial 
productivity. There is much empirical evidence for this type of results (see, for 
instance, Dimitrova-Grajzl et al (2012), Martins (2010) or (Haitovsky (2004)). Note the 
magnitude of the coefficients. It is intuitive that the impact of the variation in total 
caseload seems to be much lower than the appointment of a new judge in a given 
court, ceteris paribus.  
As a robustness check, we also used a fixed-effects (within) IV regression model 
using lags of total_caseload, judges and jw_judges as IV variables. The results stay the 
same: a negative causality effect of judges on judicial productivity and a positive 
causality effect of the amount of court work per judge on average judicial productivity. 
These results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. (See Table IV appendix 
II) 
 The descriptive statistics analysis done in Chapter 3 led us to believe that a 
major issue for the Portuguese judicial system is the inability to tackle the amount of 
demand for executive lawsuits. Table III, appendix II, shows the results for a model 
similar to equation (4.3) where the dependent variable is the ratio between the 
number of executive lawsuits per resources – variable defined in equation (3.4) – and 
the explanatory variable total_caseload is replaced by executive_caseload, defined as 
filed plus pending executive lawsuits over resources. Even though coefficients are 
lower, the conclusion remains the same: a positive impact of the amount of caseload 
per judge on average judicial productivity and a negative causality effect of the 
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u e  of judges o  a e age judge’s p odu ti it . Fu the o e, the ag itude o  the 
coefficient for the number of judges is higher than the one found using the two-way FE 
model. Less economically developed regions are more productive – judgeship-wise – 
relative to the more developed region, even though this result is not statistically 
significant. In order to compare productivity in executive lawsuits with the remaining 
lawsuits, I use a similar model to analyze declarative lawsuits and economic lawsuits. 
Table V and VI represent the results for declarative and economic files, respectively. 
The appointment of new judges is no longer statistically significant to explain 
productivity. Note, however, that caseload remains having a positive impact on 
productivity. Also, note that the magnitude of the coefficient on total caseload is 
higher in the economic and declarative files compared to the execution files.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Fairly often one hears that one of the roots of  anemic potencial output growth in 
Portugal lays on the judicial system. The main propose of this work was to investigate 
some problems faced by the Portuguese Judicial system and provide a number of 
solutions. I present some descriptive statistics about the Portuguese judicial system 
and suggest a probable source of ou t’s o gestio : executive lawsuits in first 
instance courts. Having encountered a problem I continue showing what caused it and 
what the judicial system has done to tackle the problem. First instance judicial courts 
where faced with a very high increase in demand for executive lawsuits and 
productivity was not able to respond promptly. The solution – Juízos de execução – 
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was not better, either. The need to improve productivity in judicial courts led me to 
model its determinants through, mainly, the use of the average amount of court work 
per judge, the number of judges and the average number of judicial workers per judge. 
To achieve such a goal I primarily employed an OLS regression to find a positive causal 
effect of the average amount of caseload and number of court workers per judge on 
judge’s p odu ti it . A k owledging possible endogeneity issues I followed with a two-
way fixed effects model. I found evidence of a positive causal relationship of the 
average caseload per judge on judicial productivity. On the other hand, there was 
negative causal effect of the nu e  of judges o  judge’s p odu ti it . Using only data 
for executive files, similar results were found. As a robustness test I have made use of a 
Fixed-effects IV regression that confirmed earlier findings. These results are in line with 
the empirical literature (see, for instance, Dimitrova-Grajzl et al et al (2012)). In fact, 
Martins (2010) finds similar behaviors for the Portuguese case. However, some caveats 
must be discussed and tackle in future research. There is a need for more and better 
data, mainly on costs of the judicial system. Another issue is that the empirical 
literature has focused on the quantity aspects only and has largely ignored the quality 
of judicial decisions. The policy implications of the above results are not obvious. First, 
o e a ot ai el  o lude that the o plete a s e  to judge’s p odu ti it  la s solo 
on the increase in judge’s o kload. As stated a o e, the e a e ualit  i pli ations 
that are not handled in my model and can be of significance. Similarly, the increase in 
the number of judges seems to imply a fall in judicial productivity, but may bring about 
unobserved quality gains. 
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Picture 1: Supreme court 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
Picture 2: Second instance Courts 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 




Picture 3: First instance Courts 
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Picture 4: Backlog Clear rate by Economic Region 
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Figure 5: Backlog Clear rate by type of court 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
Table I: 
      Total     1.0592063   .93208532        6172
                                                 
       2011     1.0460208   .66990117         321
       2010     1.0986178   .64750457         324
       2009     1.3093792   1.4282223         341
       2008     1.2998747   2.7854679         343
       2007     1.3276304   1.5169912         348
       2006     1.1851356   .75663764         343
       2005     1.0625209   .53703124         341
       2004     .95686698   .34659782         341
       2003     .92839597   .36739153         339
       2002     1.0032977   .38896301         339
       2001     1.0729646   .54810108         339
       2000     1.1165561   .56149498         338
       1999     .96931189   .45235729         343
       1998     .94460319   .22093398         299
       1997     .86523269   .20602111         297
       1996      .8725112   .20428998         296
       1995     .91713027   .24793598         295
       1994      1.165172   .30964703         293
       1993     .88404543    .1999266         292
                                                 
        ano          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                  Summary of total_clearance
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Figure 6: 
  
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s alculations 
Figure 7: 
 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
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Table II: Clearance Rate in T. Comarca 
“ou e: DGPJ a d autho ’s al ulatio s 
 
Appendix II 
Table I – Judicial productivity using OLS 
      Total      .9463581    .3797471        4152
                                                 
       2011     .91991326   .13034724         206
       2010     .92749237   .31454537         206
       2009     1.2395011   1.3446844         221
       2008     .94422196   .15668988         221
       2007     .92572973    .1479077         221
       2006     .93842247   .20957924         220
       2005     .87017489   .16478769         220
       2004     .85951319   .16710786         220
       2003     .88169304   .15307959         220
       2002     .94663523   .17566237         220
       2001     .95170365   .20216016         220
       2000     1.0074646   .18990581         214
       1999     .87649528   .20375014         222
       1998     .95073492   .17751099         222
       1997     .85060457   .16975089         222
       1996     .86775449   .16916037         221
       1995     .94124438   .24901812         220
       1994     1.2022797   .32240105         218
       1993     .88032853   .19183185         218
                                                 
        ano          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                  Summary of total_clearance
























































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 





















































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Number of cdtrib 229 
Standard errors in parentheses 
                                     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table VII – Correlation matrix 
 
 
Table VI – Variable names, description and sources 
 
Tribunal Court name Source 
Cdproc Litigation code  
Cdtrib Court code  
Anotrib Year code  
entrados Filed files DGPJ 
Findos Terminated files DGPJ 
Pendentes Pending files DGPJ 
Judges Number of judges  DGPJ 
Juizes_mp Number of DA judges DGPJ 
Ne_ne Assessores DGPJ 




Sj_sec_just Sec. Judiciais - Secretário de justiça DGPJ 
sj_escrivao_adj Sec. Judiciais - Escrivão de direito ou 
adjunto 
DGPJ 
sj_escrivao_aux Sec. Judiciais - Escrivão de auxiliar DGPJ 
Sj_informatica Sec. Judiciais - Pessoal de informática DGPJ 
Sj_tecnico Sec. Judiciais - Pessoal técnico-
profissional 
DGPJ 
   companies     0.7754   0.8052   1.0000
 pop_density     0.7558   1.0000
         PPI     1.0000
                                         
                    PPI pop_de~y compan~s
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Sj_auxiliar Sec. Judiciais - Pessoal auxiliar e 
operário 
DGPJ 
Sj_ne Sec. Judiciais - N.E. DGPJ 
Mp_sec_just Serviços do MP - Secretário de 
justiça/Secretár 
DGPJ 
mp_escrivao_adj Serviços do MP - Escrivão de direito 
ou adjunto 
DGPJ 
mp_escrivao_aux Serviços do MP - Escrivão auxiliar DGPJ 
Mp_tecnico Serviços do MP - Pessoal técnico-
profissional 
DGPJ 
Mp_auxiliar Serviços do MP - Pessoal auxiliar e 
operário 
DGPJ 
Mp_ne Serviços do MP - N.E. DGPJ 
sc_sec_trib_sup Serviços Comuns - Secretário de 
tribunal superior 
DGPJ 
Sc_sec_just Serviços Comuns - Secretário de 
justiça/Secretár 
DGPJ 
sc_escrivao_adj Serviços Comuns - Escrivão de direito 
ou adjunto 
DGPJ 
Sc_escrivao_aux Serviços Comuns - Escrivão 
auxiliar/técnico de j 
DGPJ 
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Sc_informatica Serviços Comuns - Pessoal de 
informática 
DGPJ 
Sc_tecnico Serviços Comuns - Pessoal técnico-
profissional 
DGPJ 
Sc_auxiliar Serviços Comuns - Pessoal auxiliar e 
operário 
DGPJ 
Sc_ne Serviços Comuns - N.E. DGPJ 
Adv_masc Number of male lawyers DGPJ 
Adv_fem Number of female lawyers DGPJ 
Adv_est_masc Number of intern male lawyers DGPJ 
Adv_est_fem Number of intern female lawyers DGPJ 
Solic_masc Number of male solicitors DGPJ 
Solic_fem Number of female solicitors DGPJ 
Solic_exec_masc Number of executive male solicitors DGPJ 
Solic_exec_fem Number of executive female 
solicitors 
DGPJ 
Solic_est_masc Number of intern male solicitors DGPJ 
Solic_est_fem Number of intern female solicitors DGPJ 
Pop_density Population density INE 
Companies Number of companies in concelho INE 
PPI Purchasing power parity in concelho INE 
Basico (Alunos matriculados no ensino 
básico/ População residente com 
idade entre 6 a 14 anos)*100 
INE 
Secundario (Alunos matriculados no ensino 
secundário/ População residente 
com idade entre 15 a 17 anos)*100 
INE 
superior (Diplomados do ensino superior/ 
População residente com idade entre 
20 e 29 anos)*1000 
INE 
Entrad1 Número de processos entrados de 
Acções declarativas comuns 
DGPJ 
Find1 Número de processos findos de 
Acções declarativas comuns 
DGPJ 
Pend1 Número de processos pendentes de DGPJ 
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Acções declarativas comuns 
Entrad2 Número de processos entrados de 
Acção Declarativa(DL.108/2006) 
DGPJ 
Find2 Número de processos findos de 
Acção Declarativa(DL.108/2006) 
DGPJ 
Pend2 Número de processos pendentes de 
Acção Declarativa(DL.108/2006) 
DGPJ 
Entrad3 Número de processos entrados de 
Execução comum 
DGPJ 
Find3 Número de processos findos de 
Execução comum 
DGPJ 
Pend3 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execução comum 
DGPJ 
Entrad4 Número de processos entrados de 
Execução comum (< 15-Set-2003) 
DGPJ 
Find4 Número de processos findos de 
Execução comum (< 15-Set-2003) 
DGPJ 
Pend4 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execução comum (< 15-Set-2003) 
DGPJ 
Entrad5 Número de processos entrados de 
Execução especial 
DGPJ 
Find5 Número de processos findos de 
Execução especial 
DGPJ 
Pend5 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execução especial 
DGPJ 
Entrad6 Número de processos entrados de 
Execução Cump.Obrig.Pecuniária 
DGPJ 
Find6 Número de processos findos de 
Execução Cump.Obrig.Pecuniária 
DGPJ 
Pend6 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execução Cump.Obrig.Pecuniária 
DGPJ 
Entrad7 Número de processos entrados de 
Execuções N.E. 
DGPJ 
Find7 Número de processos findos de 
Execuções N.E. 
DGPJ 
Diogo Lima The Portuguese judicial system 
51 
 
Pend7 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execuções N.E. 
DGPJ 
Entrad8 Número de processos entrados de 
cível – administrative especial 
DGPJ 
Find8 Número de processos findos de cível 
– administrative especial 
DGPJ 
Pend8 Número de processos pendentes de 
cível – administrative especial 
DGPJ 
Entrad9 Número de processos entrados de 
divórcios e separações 
DGPJ 
Find9 Número de processos findos de 
divórcios e separações 
DGPJ 
Pend9 Número de processos pendentes de 
divórcios e separações 
DGPJ 
Entrad10 Número de processos entrados de 
cível - inventário 
DGPJ 
Find10 Número de processos findos de cível 
- inventário 
DGPJ 
Pend10 Número de processos pendentes de 
cível - inventário 
DGPJ 
Entrad11 Número de processos entrados de 
Falência/ Insolvência/ R.Emp. 
DGPJ 
Find11 Número de processos findos de 
Falência/ Insolvência/ R.Emp. 
DGPJ 
Pend11 Número de processos pendentes de 
Falência/ Insolvência/ R.Emp. 
DGPJ 
Entrad12 Número de processos entrados de 
cível - Outras acções especiais 
DGPJ 
Find12 Número de processos findos de cível 
- Outras acções especiais 
DGPJ 
Pend12 Número de processos pendentes de 
cível - Outras acções especiais 
DGPJ 
Entrad13 Número de processos entrados de 
Proc. Especial Revitalização 
DGPJ 
Find13 Número de processos findos de Proc. 
Especial Revitalização 
DGPJ 
Pend13 Número de processos pendentes de DGPJ 
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Proc. Especial Revitalização 
Entrad14 Número de processos entrados de 
cível - Procedimentos cautelares 
DGPJ 
Find14 Número de processos findos de cível 
- Procedimentos cautelares 
DGPJ 
Pend14 Número de processos pendentes de 
cível - Procedimentos cautelares 
DGPJ 
Entrad15 Número de processos entrados de 
Procedimento Europeu Injunção 
DGPJ 
Find15 Número de processos findos de 
Procedimento Europeu Injunção 
DGPJ 
Pend15 Número de processos pendentes de 
Procedimento Europeu Injunção 
DGPJ 
Entrad16 Número de processos entrados de 
Embargos / Oposição 
DGPJ 
Find16 Número de processos findos de 
Embargos / Oposição 
DGPJ 
Pend16 Número de processos pendentes de 
Embargos / Oposição 
DGPJ 
Entrad17 Número de processos entrados de 
Habilitação de Herdeiros 
DGPJ 
Find17 Número de processos findos de 
Habilitação de Herdeiros 
DGPJ 
Pend17 Número de processos pendentes de 
Habilitação de Herdeiros 
DGPJ 
Entrad18 Número de processos entrados de 
Reclamação de Créditos 
DGPJ 
Find18 Número de processos findos de 
Reclamação de Créditos 
DGPJ 
Pend18 Número de processos pendentes de 
Reclamação de Créditos 
DGPJ 
Entrad19 Número de processos entrados de 
Notificação Judicial Avulsa 
DGPJ 
Find19 Número de processos findos de 
Notificação Judicial Avulsa 
DGPJ 
Pend19 Número de processos pendentes de DGPJ 
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Notificação Judicial Avulsa 
Entrad20 Número de processos entrados de 
Notificação Judicial Avulsa 
DGPJ 
Find20 Número de processos findos de 
Notificação Judicial Avulsa 
DGPJ 
Pend20 Número de processos pendentes de 
Notificação Judicial Avulsa 
DGPJ 
Entrad21 Número de processos entrados de 
cível - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Find21 Número de processos findos de cível 
- Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Pend21 Número de processos pendentes de 
cível - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Entrad22 Número de processos entrados de  
Justiça Penal - Comum 
DGPJ 
Find22 Número de processos findos de 
Justiça Penal - Comum 
DGPJ 
Pend22 Número de processos pendentes de 
Justiça Penal – Comum 
DGPJ 
Entrad23 Número de processos entrados de  
Justiça Penal - especial 
DGPJ 
Find23 Número de processos findos de 
Justiça Penal - especial 
DGPJ 
Pend23 Número de processos pendentes de 
Justiça Penal – especial 
DGPJ 
Entrad24 Número de processos entrados de  
Recurso contra-ordenação 
DGPJ 
Find24 Número de processos findos de 
Recurso contra-ordenação 
DGPJ 
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Pend24 Número de processos pendentes de 
Recurso contra-ordenação 
DGPJ 
Entrad25 Número de processos entrados de 
Transgressão 
DGPJ 
Find25 Número de processos findos de 
Transgressão 
DGPJ 
Pend25 Número de processos pendentes de 
Transgressão 
DGPJ 
Entrad26 Número de processos entrados de 
Processo de Segurança 
DGPJ 
Find26 Número de processos findos de 
Processo de Segurança 
DGPJ 
Pend26 Número de processos pendentes de 
Processo de Segurança 
DGPJ 
Entrad27 Número de processos entrados de 
Concessão Lib. Condicional 
DGPJ 
Find27 Número de processos findos de 
Concessão Lib. Condicional 
DGPJ 
Pend27 Número de processos pendentes de 
Concessão Lib. Condicional 
DGPJ 
Entrad28 Número de processos entrados de 
Reabilitação Judicial 
DGPJ 
Find28 Número de processos findos de 
Reabilitação Judicial 
DGPJ 
Pend28 Número de processos pendentes de 
Reabilitação Judicial 
DGPJ 
Entrad29 Número de processos entrados de 
Indulto 
DGPJ 
Find29 Número de processos findos de 
Indulto 
DGPJ 
Pend29 Número de processos pendentes de 
Indulto 
DGPJ 
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Entrad30 Número de processos entrados de 
Saída Precária Prolongada 
DGPJ 
Find30 Número de processos findos de Saída 
Precária Prolongada 
DGPJ 
Pend30 Número de processos pendentes de 
Saída Precária Prolongada 
DGPJ 
Entrad31 Número de processos entrados de 
Liberdade para Prova 
DGPJ 
Find31 Número de processos findos de 
Liberdade para Prova 
DGPJ 
Pend31 Número de processos pendentes de 
Liberdade para Prova 
DGPJ 
Entrad32 Número de processos entrados de 
Proc. Saída Provisória 
DGPJ 
Find32 Número de processos findos de Proc. 
Saída Provisória 
DGPJ 
Pend32 Número de processos pendentes de 
Proc. Saída Provisória 
DGPJ 
Entrad33 Número de processos entrados de 
Revogação Liberd. Condicional 
DGPJ 
Find33 Número de processos findos de 
Revogação Liberd. Condicional 
DGPJ 
Pend33 Número de processos pendentes de 
Revogação Liberd. Condicional 
DGPJ 
Entrad34 Número de processos entrados de 
Revog. Saída Prec. Prolongada 
DGPJ 
Find34 Número de processos findos de 
Revog. Saída Prec. Prolongada 
DGPJ 
Pend34 Número de processos pendentes de 
Revog. Saída Prec. Prolongada 
DGPJ 
Entrad35 Número de processos entrados de 
Proc. Delinq. Inimp. Perigoso 
DGPJ 
Find35 Número de processos findos de Proc. 
Delinq. Inimp. Perigoso 
DGPJ 
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Pend35 Número de processos pendentes de 
Proc. Delinq. Inimp. Perigoso 
DGPJ 
Entrad36 Número de processos entrados de 
Modificação Execução da Pena 
DGPJ 
Find36 Número de processos findos de 
Modificação Execução da Pena 
DGPJ 
Pend36 Número de processos pendentes de 
Modificação Execução da Pena 
DGPJ 
Entrad37 Número de processos entrados de 
Revogação Liberdade Prova 
DGPJ 
Find37 Número de processos findos de 
Revogação Liberdade Prova 
DGPJ 
Pend37 Número de processos pendentes de 
Revogação Liberdade Prova 
DGPJ 
Entrad38 Número de processos entrados de 
Complemento Alter.Perigosidade 
DGPJ 
Find38 Número de processos findos de 
Complemento Alter.Perigosidade 
DGPJ 
Pend38 Número de processos pendentes de 
Complemento Alter.Perigosidade 
DGPJ 
Entrad39 Número de processos entrados de 
Complementares (Outros) 
DGPJ 
Find39 Número de processos findos de 
Complementares (Outros) 
DGPJ 
Pend39 Número de processos pendentes de 
Complementares (Outros) 
DGPJ 
Entrad40 Número de processos entrados de 
Cancelamento Prov.Reg.Criminal) 
DGPJ 
Find40 Número de processos findos de 
Cancelamento Prov.Reg.Criminal 
DGPJ 
Pend40 Número de processos pendentes de DGPJ 




Entrad41 Número de processos entrados de 
Incidente de Incumprimento 
DGPJ 
Find41 Número de processos findos de 
Incidente de Incumprimento 
DGPJ 
Pend41 Número de processos pendentes de 
Incidente de Incumprimento 
DGPJ 
Entrad42 Número de processos entrados de 
Recurso de Sanção Disciplinar 
DGPJ 
Find42 Número de processos findos de 
Recurso de Sanção Disciplinar 
DGPJ 
Pend42 Número de processos pendentes de 
Recurso de Sanção Disciplinar 
DGPJ 
Entrad43 Número de processos entrados de 
Processo Supletivo 
DGPJ 
Find43 Número de processos findos de 
Processo Supletivo 
DGPJ 
Pend43 Número de processos pendentes de 
Processo Supletivo 
DGPJ 
Entrad44 Número de processos entrados de 
Cúmulo Jurídico 
DGPJ 
Find44 Número de processos findos de 
Cúmulo Jurídico 
DGPJ 
Pend44 Número de processos pendentes de 
Cúmulo Jurídico 
DGPJ 
Entrad45 Número de processos entrados de 
Caução (art.º 197.º CPP) 
DGPJ 
Find45 Número de processos findos de 
Caução (art.º 197.º CPP) 
DGPJ 
Pend45 Número de processos pendentes de 
Caução (art.º 197.º CPP) 
DGPJ 
Entrad46 Número de processos entrados de 
Caução Económica (art.º 227.º) 
DGPJ 
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Find46 Número de processos findos de 
Caução Económica (art.º 227.º) 
DGPJ 
Pend46 Número de processos pendentes de 
Caução Económica (art.º 227.º) 
DGPJ 
Entrad47 Número de processos entrados de 
Interrogatório Estrangeiros) 
DGPJ 
Find47 Número de processos findos de 
Interrogatório Estrangeiros 
DGPJ 
Pend47 Número de processos pendentes de 
Interrogatório Estrangeiros 
DGPJ 
Entrad48 Número de processos entrados de 
Expulsão Judicial (DL 244/98 
DGPJ 
Find48 Número de processos findos de 
Expulsão Judicial (DL 244/98 
DGPJ 
Pend48 Número de processos pendentes de 
Expulsão Judicial (DL 244/98 
DGPJ 
Entrad49 Número de processos entrados de 
Internam. comp. (confirmação) 
DGPJ 
Find49 Número de processos findos de 
Internam. comp. (confirmação) 
DGPJ 
Pend49 Número de processos pendentes de 
Internam. comp. (confirmação) 
DGPJ 
Entrad50 Número de processos entrados de 
Execução Sentença Estrangeira 
DGPJ 
Find50 Número de processos findos de 
Execução Sentença Estrangeira 
DGPJ 
Pend50 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execução Sentença Estrangeira 
DGPJ 
Entrad51 Número de processos entrados de 
Habeas Corpus 
DGPJ 
Find51 Número de processos findos de 
Habeas Corpus 
DGPJ 
Pend51 Número de processos pendentes de 
Habeas Corpus 
DGPJ 
Entrad52 Número de processos entrados de 
Caução boa conduta (C.Estrada) 
DGPJ 
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Find52 Número de processos findos de 
Caução boa conduta (C.Estrada) 
DGPJ 
Pend52 Número de processos pendentes de 
Caução boa conduta (C.Estrada) 
DGPJ 
Entrad53 Número de processos entrados de 
Incid. Quebra Sigilo Bancário 
DGPJ 
Find53 Número de processos findos de Incid. 
Quebra Sigilo Bancário) 
DGPJ 
Pend53 Número de processos pendentes de 
Incid. Quebra Sigilo Bancário) 
DGPJ 
Entrad54 Número de processos entrados de 
Incidente de Alienação Menta 
DGPJ 
Find54 Número de processos findos de 
Incidente de Alienação Menta 
DGPJ 
Pend54 Número de processos pendentes de 
Incidente de Alienação Menta 
DGPJ 
Entrad55 Número de processos entrados de 
Execução de Sanção Acessória 
DGPJ 
Find55 Número de processos findos de 
Execução de Sanção Acessória 
DGPJ 
Pend55 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execução de Sanção Acessória 
DGPJ 
Entrad56 Número de processos entrados de 
Fixação Indemnização (DL26/97) 
DGPJ 
Find56 Número de processos findos de 
Fixação Indemnização (DL26/97) 
DGPJ 
Pend56 Número de processos pendentes de 
Fixação Indemnização (DL26/97) 
DGPJ 
Entrad57 Número de processos entrados de 
Caução boa conduta (L 109/91)) 
DGPJ 
Find57 Número de processos findos de 
Caução boa conduta (L 109/91) 
DGPJ 
Pend57 Número de processos pendentes de 
Caução boa conduta (L 109/91) 
DGPJ 
Entrad58 Número de processos entrados de 
Internamento Compulsivo 
DGPJ 
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Find58 Número de processos findos de 
Internamento Compulsivo 
DGPJ 
Pend58 Número de processos pendentes de 
Internamento Compulsivo 
DGPJ 
Entrad59 Número de processos entrados de 
Incid. Dtos Terceiro - DL15/93 
DGPJ 
Find59 Número de processos findos de Incid. 
Dtos Terceiro - DL15/93 
DGPJ 
Pend59 Número de processos pendentes de 
Incid. Dtos Terceiro - DL15/93 
DGPJ 
Entrad60 Número de processos entrados de 
Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Find60 Número de processos findos de 
Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Pend60 Número de processos pendentes de 
Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Entrad61 Número de processos entrados de 
Reconhecimento Exec de Decisão 
DGPJ 
Find61 Número de processos findos de 
Reconhecimento Exec de Decisão 
DGPJ 
Pend61 Número de processos pendentes de 
Reconhecimento Exec de Decisão 
DGPJ 
Entrad62 Número de processos entrados de 
Comum 
DGPJ 
Find62 Número de processos findos de 
Comum 
DGPJ 
Pend62 Número de processos pendentes de 
Comum 
DGPJ 
Entrad63 Número de processos entrados de 
Execução Laboral 
DGPJ 
Find63 Número de processos findos de 
Execução Laboral 
DGPJ 
Pend63 Número de processos pendentes de 
Execução Laboral 
DGPJ 
Entrad64 Número de processos entrados de DGPJ 
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Acidente trabalho/doença prof. 
Find64 Número de processos findos de 
Acidente trabalho/doença prof. 
DGPJ 
Pend64 Número de processos pendentes de 
Acidente trabalho/doença prof. 
DGPJ 
Entrad65 Número de processos entrados de 
Outras acções especiais 
DGPJ 
Find65 Número de processos findos de 
Outras acções especiais 
DGPJ 
Pend65 Número de processos pendentes de 
Outras acções especiais 
DGPJ 
Entrad66 Número de processos entrados de 
Procedimentos cautelares 
DGPJ 
Find66 Número de processos findos de 
Procedimentos cautelares 
DGPJ 
Pend66 Número de processos pendentes de 
Procedimentos cautelares 
DGPJ 
Entrad67 Número de processos entrados de 
laboral - Embargos / Oposição 
DGPJ 
Find67 Número de processos findos de 
laboral - Embargos / Oposição 
DGPJ 
Pend67 Número de processos pendentes de 
laboral - Embargos / Oposição 
DGPJ 
Entrad68 Número de processos entrados de 
laboral - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Find68 Número de processos findos de 
laboral - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Pend68 Número de processos pendentes de 
laboral - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Entrad69 Número de processos entrados de 
laboral penal - Recurso contra-
ordenação 
DGPJ 
Find69 Número de processos findos de 
laboral penal - Recurso contra-
ordenação 
DGPJ 
Pend69 Número de processos pendentes de DGPJ 
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laboral penal - Recurso contra-
ordenação 
Entrad70 Número de processos entrados de 
laboral penal – Transgressão 
DGPJ 
Find70 Número de processos findos de 
laboral penal – Transgressão  
DGPJ 
Pend70 Número de processos pendentes de 
laboral penal – Transgressão 
DGPJ 
Entrad71 Número de processos entrados de 
laboral penal - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Find71 Número de processos findos de 
laboral penal - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Pend71 Número de processos pendentes de 
laboral penal - Outros processos N.E. 
DGPJ 
Entrad72 Número de processos entrados de 
Processo tutelar cível 
DGPJ 
Find72 Número de processos findos de 
Processo tutelar cível 
DGPJ 
Pend72 Número de processos pendentes de 
Processo tutelar cível 
DGPJ 
Entrad73 Número de processos entrados de 
Promoção/Protecção (men.risco) 
DGPJ 
Find73 Número de processos findos de 
Promoção/Protecção (men.risco) 
DGPJ 
Pend73 Número de processos pendentes de 
Promoção/Protecção (men.risco) 
DGPJ 
Entrad74 Número de processos entrados de 
Tutelar educativo (inf. penal) 
DGPJ 
Find74 Número de processos findos de 
Tutelar educativo (inf. penal) 
DGPJ 
Pend74 Número de processos pendentes de 
Tutelar educativo (inf. penal) 
DGPJ 
Entrad75 Número de processos entrados de DGPJ 
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Justiça Militar - Comum 
Find75 Número de processos findos de 
Justiça Militar - Comum 
DGPJ 
Pend75 Número de processos pendentes de 
Justiça Militar – Comum 
DGPJ 
Execuçao_entrados                 
Execuçao_findos               
Execuçao_pendentes               




Sj_total sj_total = sj_sec_trib_sup + 
sj_sec_just + sj_escrivao_adj + 
sj_escrivao_aux + sj_informatica + 
sj_tecnico + sj_auxiliar + sj_ne 
 
sj_total_juizes sj_total_juizes = sj_total / juizes  
Total_advogados total_advogados = adv_masc + 
adv_fem + adv_est_masc + 
adv_est_fem 
 
Total_solicitadores total_solicitadores =  solic_masc +  
solic_fem +  solic_exec_masc +  
solic_exec_fem +  solic_est_masc +  
solic_est_fem 
 
companies                                                                          
Recursos2 recursos2 = 0.7*juizes + 
0.3*sj_total_juizes 
 
Total_prod2 total_prod2 = total_findos / 
recursos2 
 
Total_carga2 total_carga2 = (total_entrados + 
total_pendentes) / recursos2 
 
Total_congestion total_congestion = (total_pendentes 
- total_entrados + total_findos) / 
total_findos 
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Total_backlog total_backlog = total_findos / 
(total_pendentes + total_entrados) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
